Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 13

Issue 5

Article 3

10-1993

(Non)Religiousness in Slovenia
Niko Toś
University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Toś, Niko (1993) "(Non)Religiousness in Slovenia," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol.
13 : Iss. 5 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol13/iss5/3

This Article, Exploration, or Report is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

(NON)RELIGIOUSNESS IN SLOVENIA
by Niko To~
Dr. Niko Tos is professor at the School of Social Science at the University of
Ljubljana. He and several of his colleagues undertook the first public opinion polls
in Slovenia (which was at that time a republic in Yugoslavia). This paper was
prepared for a conference in Spain held in September 1993 but is the first appearance
of this material in English.
Introduction
Systematic empirical sociological research into religiousness and attitudes towards the
church has been conducted in Slovenia since the mid-Sixties. However it was only after the
establishment of Slovenian state independence (June 1991) that researchers were able to join
two major international projects investigating the phenomenon of religion in the
contemporary world, namely the World Values Survey (WVS) 1 and the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP). 2 The present text first briefly describes circumstances in Slovenia,
from the end of the Second World War to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which determined
the status of believers and the relationship between church and state, then reviews the
findings of sociological research into religiousness carried out over the period 1968-1990, and
presents the religion section of the WVS compared with the findings of ISSP, Religion 1991.

1. Slovenia prior to the WVS enquiry 0991)

1

World Values Survey (WVS), Professor Ronald lngelhart, Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. A national survey of a representative sample
(N=1028) was conducted in February 1992 by the Research Institute of the Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Ljubljana (RI FSS), under the author's leadership.
2

ISSP, Programme 1991, Religion. A national survey of a representative sample (N=2080)
was conducted in November 1991 by the RI SSF in the framework of the project Slovenian
Public Opinion which has been underway in Slovenia in similar way to the GSS (USA) or
ALLBUS (Germany) since 1968 under the author's leadership.
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Slovenia in Yugoslavia and independence. The WVS 1991 and ISSP, Religion 1991
inquiries took place at a crucial point in Slovenian history, directly after the first democratic
elections (April 1990) and following the country's achievement of independence. Previously
Slovenia had been a part of the federal Yugoslav state. Its 45-year postwar development had
been characterized by a dominant ideology which underpinned all societal, economic and
social relations, and a single political party which autonomously ruled on all ideological issues
and at the same time held total control of the army, police, economy, mass media, as well as
educational institutions and the church. The everyday state of affairs in postwar Yugoslavia-notwithstanding the original concepts of self-management socialism and federalism--in
essence comprised all the components of Friedrich's definition of totalitarianism (Friedrich,
Brzezinski, 1956). This is not to overlook of course all the distinctive features and
divergencies in Slovenia's development inside this essentially totalitarian skeleton. In the
wake of state independence in 1991 Slovenia is attempting to establish itself as a democratic
society through a plurality of political parties, the reinstitution of private property and a
market economy, the welfare state. It is shaping itself anew; a new democratic institutional
political system is arising with the germ of new social structures and new political practice.
The situation is marked further by an economic and social crisis which is expressed partly
as a crisis of values.
Although observing the situation in Slovenia over the past decades has constantly
encouraged consideration and characterization of the differences and peculiarities in its
development compared with the rest of Yugoslavia and other East bloc countries, there is no
doubt that the revolution was made possible by the collapse of the so-called socialist systems
and the profound political, economic and cultural crisis of Yugoslav federalism. Slovenia,
along with the other Central and East European formerly Communist countries was caught
up in the third wave of democratization following the Second World War. The first wave
encompassed the pacified states--the Axis Powers; the second mainly ecompassed the
Romance and Latin Amedcan countries, and in Europe, Spain, Portugal as well as Greece;
the present, third wave encompasses the entire European part of the former East bloc. The
course of transformation of these countries and their capacity to establish democratic
institutions and political relations is determined by the intersection and sources of certain
tensions or conflict relations, namely: (a) the redefinition of the nation or the nation state,
with all the ramifications that this process of redefinition generates and that influence the
consolidation of democratic institutions. An important part is played in these processes by
the so-called national churches as they break out of their marginalization during communist
rule. The churches are in renewal, gaining importance as a factor in awakening national
consciousness, and hence as a political factor as well. This is demonstrated by the situation
in Russia, Croatia, in Serbia, and in Poland throughout, (b) the question of the relationship
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between democratic institutions and the economic restructuring of society (Bruszt, Janos,
1992), and (c) the eradication of the Communist parties' ideological monopoly while at the
same time preventing the emergence of others.
The collapse of the East European Communist systems then has quite obviously been
marked by a redefinition of the nation and the nation state. In Yugoslavia this striving to
redefine the position of one nation at the expense of others, and in particular a more
powerful one inside a federal system, displays all its destructive might. But the redefinition
of a nation state may--in contrast to the foregoing--also prove a significant impulse for the
development of democratic institutions. Considering the current situation in Slovenia and the
changes already forged, it may be stated that issues related to national constituting have not
been at the forefront since international recognition was achieved (Tos, 1992). In the initial
period following the revolution the process of constituting a national state creates an appropriate environment and stimulus for the establishment (nominally) of a democratic
institutional system. In Slovenia the church did not have a dominant role in these processes,
but it did finally escape the marginal position it was assigned after the Second World War. 3
The position of the church in Slovenia in this period is determined by certain essential
circumstances and factors (Roter, 1993):
(a) From the time of Christianization and the Slovenes' settlement to the present-day, the
leading ecclesiastical institution has been the Roman Catholic Church which has decisively
influenced the development of the national culture and policies of the Slovenes down the
centuries.
(b) During the Reformation, Protestantism gained sway in Slovenia particularly in the
towns and was forcibly eradicated by the Catholic Church during the Counter Reformation.
Today the proportion of Protestants in Slovenia is negligibly low and restricted primarily to
the border area near Hungary.
(c) During the Second World War, when Slovenia was occupied and annexed partly by the
German Reich and partly by Fascist Italy and Hungary, the Roman Catholic Church did not
join the mass Partisan resistance movement, the National Liberation Front, which was led by
the Communist Party; instead it aligned with the anti-communist movement which arose
during the war under the patronage of the occupation forces. In contrast to the Polish
Catholic Church, which was a pillar of the resistance, the Slovenian Church is characterized
more by collaborationism.

3

For more, v: Nationalities Papers, Voice from the Slovene Nation, N.Y. 1993, Vol
XXI/I.
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(d) In the postwar years the Catholic Church was persecuted in Slovenia; its property was
expropriated on the charge of collaboration; priests were also persecuted. The Church took
a negative stand towards the postwar regime which carried out a forcible agrarian reform,
nationalization, established one-party (communist) rule and the constitutional separation of
church and state. Subsequently (from the end of the 1960s) relations between church and the
state were gradually normalized (re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Holy See,
renovation of churches with state assistance, the religious press and religious celebrations
were permitted, etc.) and finally formally regulated in the new Slovenian Constitution which
posits the freedom of confession, the social and spiritual role of the church, and maintains
the principle of separation of church and state.
(e) Empirical sociological research since 1968 has shown that relative freedom of
confession nevertheless was obtained in Slovenia in the four postwar decades. A large part
of the population preserved and renewed their religious orientation as well as their ties to the
Catholic Church (more on this below). Conditions for preserving and renewing religiousness
were substantially more favourable in Slovenia than in most East European communist states,
particularly the extreme cases of East Germany and Albania.
2. Surveys of religiousness in Slovenia. 1968-1990
In presenting the state of religiousness or unreligiousness in Slovenia in the period 19681990, we may draw on a series of investigations in the context of the Slovene Public Opinion
(SP0) 4 project which has been under way since 1968. It is based on a representative sample
of the adult population of Slovenia and has regularly included religiological aspects. At the
very beginning of the survey (1968) the typology of dimensions of religiousness developed
included the variable (non- )religiousness and at the same time recorded frequency of
attendance . at religious ceremonies. Thus operationalization includes the dichotomized
dimension: religious-unreligious and the dimension of devoutness, expressed through
frequency of religious attendance. The typology includes 9 categories, namely: (1) religious-consistently devout (believers who attend services every Sunday or more often), (2) religious
--inconsistently devout (religious, who frequently attend services), (3) religious-indifferently devout (religious, who only occasionally attend and then major religious
services), (4) religious--undevout (religious, do not attend religious services), (5) undecided-devout (do not know whether they are religious or not, nevertheless attend religious

4

This survey has been under way since 1968 in the framework of the Center for Public
Opinion and Mass Communications Surveys and the Research Institute of the Faculty of
Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
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services), (6) undecided--devout (do not know whether they are religious or not, nevertheless
do not attend religious services), (7) unreligious--inconsistent (not religious, but occasionally
attend religious services), (8) unreligious--consistent (are not religious and do not attend
religious services), (9) all others.
The usefulness of this operationalization stems from the fact that Slovenia is in effect a
mono-religious region where the Roman Catholic Church dominates absolutely, such as in
Austria, Italy, Spain, etc.
TABLE 1:

(Non-)Religiousness and attendance at religious
services by the Slovenian population, 1968-1992*
1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1990

1- I am religious and regularly attend
religious services every Sunday

21.7

17.7

11.8

11.0

12.4

13.0

2- I am religious and often, at least once
a month, attend religious services

10.3

10.4

8.7

9.0

9.3

10.2

3· I am religious and only sometimes, on
major holy days and special occasions
attend religious services

23.2

23.2

20.1

21.9

28.3

31.2

12.6

8.1

4.7

5.8

6.3

7.4

5- I cannot say whether I am religious or not,
although I attend religious services

3.3

2.4

4.5

3.9

3.5

6- I cannot say whether I am religious or not,
and I do not attend religious services

5.1

7.8

6.9

7.3

6.3

3.7

1.6

2.7

3.0

2.8

2.7

25.9

28.2

40.1

35.6

27.9

23.6

2.6

2.4

1.7

2.3

1.8

2.1

100%
(2064)

100%
(2067)

100%
(2075)

100%
(2074)

4- I am religious and do not attend
religious services

7- I am not religious, although I attend
religious services
8- I am not religious and do not attend
religious services
9- I cannot answer

100%
(2475)

100%
(2098)

Source: SPO, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana
*Besides those shown, data is also available for the years 1969,
1971, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989.

The situation at the first measurement on the religiousness dimension (Table I, 1968)
shows that a good two-thirds of the population expresses belief, yet only a poor half of these
show adequate ties to the church in terms of regular or frequent attendance at religious
ceremonies; the remaining one-third of the population is unreligious and only insignificantly
tied to the church. The data obtained on (un)religiousness and (un)devoutness may be
interpreted as 'normal' for Slovenia's European (predominantly Catholic) environs at that
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time. The decades-long ideological indoctrination which denied and attacked the human,
social, and cultural essence of religion and the church as a reactionary social force did not
substantially affect the extent and intensity of religious commitment. As a consequence of
the insularity of the state (Yugoslavia) and lags in the process of its industrialization and
urbanization which were proceeding intensively in West Europe at the time, there had been
a hold-up in the process of secularization. But· it intensified with the liberalization of·
political relations in the Sixties and the opening of the borders to migratory flows. This is
illustrated well by the data for 1968-1978 in Table 1. The proportion of the religious
'devoted' to the church (regular attendance at church services) declined by almost a half;
there was a slight rise in the proportion of the· religiously undecided and a substantial
increase (from 26% to 40%) in the proportion of unreligious. In the Slovenian literature
precisely, this period is labelled a period of intensive secularization. It was not just a matter
of a decline in religiousness in general but also of weakening ties to the church. Thus, a
Slovene Catholic theologian (Rajhman, 1979) observes that for the Slovenes the epithet 'a
Catholic people' is more a reminder of the former glory of the Church and its organizational
apparatus, that the Catholic Church has to say goodbye to this epithet because the process of
secularization is so strong, and the sociological situation in Slovenia does not differ from that
in modern industrial countries. A similar fall in attendance at religious services has been
found in surveys in Austria (Zulehner, 1991, p.126). Thus. the proportion of regular and
frequent attendance in 1968 reached about 34% in Austria compared with 32% in Slovenia
where, however, the downtrend was more intensive, and by 1978, it had reached just 20.5%
and remained at a level of 20% in 1983. Nevertheless the secularization process or trend was
a phenomenon limited to the Seventies. When the cross-section 1978-1988 and later
measurements are compared it may be observed (Roter, 1989, p. 93) that in Slovene society
"certain noteworthy changes have taken place: the halting of the secularization trend which
is evident in a perceptible rise in the proportion of believers and a marked drop in the
proportion of non-believers." The proportion of those regularly attending services remained
at a low level ( 11% - 13%), although the proportion of those occasionally attending rose
substantially in that period: from 34% in 1978 to 44% in 1988 and 48% in 1990 (see Table 2).
Yet the secularization trend from the previous period had not waned entirely. The province
of church and religion somehow functioned more freely, less bindingly and more openly.
TABLE 2: Attendance at church services by the population of
Slovenia, 1968-1992
1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1990

1992

wvs
- regularly (1x weekly or more)

21.7

17.7

11 .• 8

11.0

12.4

13.0

22.7

- occasionally (less than 1x weekly)

37.2

38.5

33.8

38.4

44.3

47.6

41.0
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- does not attend
- others

41.1

43.8

100%
(2475)

100%
(2098)

54.4

50.6

43.3

39.4

36.3

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
(2064) (2067) (2075) (2074) (1035)

Source: SPO, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana

The findings of the surveys in the first decade (1968-1978) clearly show a deterioration
in the position of religion and hence a clear secularization trend, which was then followed
in the next period (I 978-1988) by a trend to religious revival. This trend is also confirmed
in the 1988-1992 period (see Table 3). A comparison of the data for 1968/1973 and
1988/1992 shows that Slovene religiousness 'revived' and that the differences were only in
nuances: there were fewer unreligious, fewer religious; there were substantially more
undecided. The question arises, what caused the 'glacial period' in religious confession from
the end of the Seventies to the mid-Eighties? In that period totalitarian ideological control
in former Yugoslavia and Slovenia eased; matters concerning relations between the Catholic
Church and the state were gradually set in order; a critical cultural and political public was
taking shape which gave rise in the latter half of the Eighties to a multitude of social
movements, with democratization of the system and the first pluralistic elections. At the same
time in both Yugoslavia and Slovenia there was then a growing ideological, systemic and
especially economic crisis; nationalism and ideas of independence were on the rise. This
'freezing' of religiousness most probably had some inner cause and was not some delayed
expression of European secularization trends.
TABLE 3: Declarations of religiousness by the population of
Slovenia, 1968-1991
1968

1973

1978

1983

1988

1990

1992
INS

- religious

"67.8

66.4

45.3

47.7

56.3

60.7

60.2

- unrel igious

29.6

29.8

42.8

38.6

30.7

26.3

23.2

2.6

10.8

11.9

13.7

13.0

13.0

17.7

100%
(2475)

100%
(2098)

100%
(2064)

100%
(2067)

100%
(2075)

100%
(2074)

100%
(1035)

- undecided

Source: SPO, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana

Naturally research in the past period has not been limited to merely determining
religiousness and devoutness but also dealt with the question of the conformity of individual
religious convictions and values to church teachings, the question of the position of faith and
believers in the church and society, and especially the question of the church as an institution
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and its position in society and the state order and in connection with the desired relationship
between church and politics.
The findings show that both the general European and the Slovene secularization trend
is evident above all in the relationship between individual belief and values and church
teachings, the way the role of the church as an institution is understood, and how the
relationship between church and politics is viewed. We present the degree of (non-)
conformity between individual religious convictions, beliefs and values, and church
teachings, on the basis of the values survey (WVS, 1991 ). The secularization trend evinced
as a high degree of disparity between individual beliefs and values and church teachings is
present throughout. Thus for example Roter (1989, p.93) concludes from the survey that "in
terms of the so-called dissolution of dogmatic belief the secularization effects of the
preceding period are still operative and evident in the ever-perceptible gap between the attitudes of believers and doctrinal church dogma, although within the group of devoutly
religious there is an increasing degree of conformity between religious convictions and
church teachings." This conformity, then, is more and more a 'privilege' of the relatively
narrow category of believers classified as devoutly religious in our system or 'kirchlich' by
Zulehner (1991, p.126). In the other groups it is low or entirely absent.
A kind of secularization trend, which is not waning, is therefore expressed in a new
freedom, openness, and optional relationship between the person and the church and religious
teachings. This flexiblity is evident not only in the attitude of the religious towards religion
and the church but also in that of the non-religious. Sectarian rejection of religion and the
church (1969: 22.8%) has almost completely faded today (1990: 4.4%). Characteristic of
Slovenia in the Eighties then is a highly predominant acceptance of the legitimacy of faith
and the church and the rules of conduct and values that it lays down. At the same time there
is increasing acceptance of the role of the church not just as a religious teacher or guardian
of religious rites and the follower's morals but in the humanitarian and charitable domain,
as well as the educational (religious).
The impact of secularization is seen from attitudes towards the relationship between
church and politics and the position of the church in the state: in the Eighties, religious and
unreligious Slovenes strongly rejected the possibility of the church adopting political
standpoints and encouraging the political activity of its followers (1962: 66%; 1990: 79%).
This predominant predilection is finally also shown in attitudes towards the new Constitution
(1991) for 71% of the population supported the constitutional rule of separation of church
and state and only 18% of respondents rejected it.
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These are only some of the aspects of empirical study of religion in Slovenia. 5
3. Slovenia's inclusion in the first international survey - ISSP. Religion 1991
ISSP, Religion 1991 is the widest empirical survey so far in the field of the sociology of
religion which was conducted in Slovenia as well as 13 other European countries, the USA,
Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and the Phillipines. The results of the Slovenian part has been
described in part by Roter ( 1992, pp. 39-46), while the first comparative analyses have been
made by Greeley of NORC, University of Chicago. From his preliminary analysis of the data
from the Slovenian part of the survey Roter confirms his thesis about "the crisis in
secularization processes" in Slovenia and the religious revival and at the same the limited
impact of church teachings on secular attitudes and values. Greely observes on the basis of
the overall comparative picture and preliminary analyses that although the data does not
indicate ideal conformity with religious orthodoxy or religious practices, it does not indicate
that faith has ceased to be important for the majority in the countries studied. In his view
the "persistence of faith" is shown by the fact that the majority in these countries believe in
God. And this holds for Slovenia as well.
With regard to the three former socialist countries included in the survey Greely
concludes that religion is reviving in them. Faith is increasing in Slovenia and East Germany,
and in Hungary church attendance is growing. East Germany is the only unreligious country
amongst those studied. He groups Slovenia with New Zealand, Norway, Britain, and West
Germany in terms of religiousness, while the United States of America, Italy, and Ireland
deviate strongly upwards.
In the countries with the highest level of faith there is also a high level of personal
happiness. Of the fifteen countries surveyed (WVS) Slovenia and Hungary rank at the bottom
with the lowest measured personal happiness. At the same time Slovenia shows an aboveaverage level of superstition, and rates high (60% above the factor average) on Greely's
"magic factor" composed of four "animistic" variables. Subsequent analysis may explain how
low subjective happiness and high superstition (expressed by the religious and unreligious)
go together with a relatively high level of unreligious in the same population. Are the
relatively low faith and high superstitiousness related to the constant repetition of threats and

5

Most of the surveys in this period were conducted in the framework of the Centre for
the Study of Religion and the Church, or the Center for Public Opinion and Mass
Communications Research of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana; recently
surveys in the field of pastoral sociology have begun to be conducted in the framework of
the Theology Faculty, University of Ljubljana.
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risks that have confronted the Slovenes down the centuries (and especially the last few
decades) at the crossroads of different systems, cultures and traditions, and particularly as
the nation sets out on the road of national independence and has no control over external
factors? I end this thought with Greeley's reference to recent studies of magic practices in
African and Asian societies which suggest that their fundamental purpose is to reduce
anxiety; one does not need magic when fishing in the lagoon; one needs it when venturing
into the open seas. Belief in magic rises with fatalism and nihilism and is highest amongst
those who are both nihilists and fatalists. Our research to date has not shown the average
Slovene to be fatalistic or nihilistic. Is the high level of superstition found an artefact? Should
different explanations be sought? Or do we still not know enough, on the basis of the surveys
made, about the beliefs and values of the Slovenes? It must also be noted that Greeley ranks
West Germany and Great Britain close to Slovenia on the magic factor. He goes on to
consider atheism and concludes that in the contemporary world this is more a question of
"believing atheism," which is also true for Slovenia where atheists subscribe to various forms
of belief or superstitions. Thus for example 38% of Slovenian atheists believe in astrology,
as in West Germany (32%).
This comparative analysis of ISSP, Religion 1991 deals in particular with the position of
religion in the former socialist countries. Greeley speaks of a resurgence of hope related to
the fall of socialism when he analyses the circumstances determining faith in Slovenia,
Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. He wonders why faith declined so steeply in East
Germany and not in Slovenia or Hungary. In Slovenia 11% of the population has no religious
affiliation, in Hungary 5%, and in East Germany 65%. He attributes the differences to East
Germany's traditional Protestantism and the fact that it did not have a powerful Catholic
Church, to its especially severe ideological indoctrination and regime, and to the fact that the
fall of religion was taken more literally than in other socialist countries.
My own impression from a review of the code book of the international survey is that
in respect of religiousness, intensity and extent of belief, evaluation of the position of the
church, and the influence of church teachings on attitudes and values, Slovenia tends to form
a group with West Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Austria. In devoutness and
values Slovenia differs strongly from the United States of America, Ireland, and Italy. In
view of this it may be said that although it is located in Central Europe, Slovenia belongs
more to the West European cultural-civilizational fold.
4. World Value Survey - Slovenia Survey 1992
Participation in the World Value Survey through the survey conducted in Slovenia in
February 1992 brought the sociology of religion in this country new possibilities for
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describing and explaining the phenomenon of religiousness-unreligiousness, attitudes towards
the church, and the influence of church teachings and rules on actual conduct and attitudes.
Identification with religion and the church may be expressed by statements of religiousness,
affiliation to a church or religious group, or by attending religious or church services. Table
3 shows that the WVS found 60.2% of Slovenes are religious, 17.7% are undecided, and 23.2%
are unreligious. Only a small part of the unreligious respondents (6.9% or a poor third)
describe themselves as atheists. Another central dimension of religiousness in WVS analyses
to date has been the concept of god. In the population surveyed 19.8% subscribed to a theistic
concept of a "personal god,", 38.6% to a deistic concept of "some sort of spirit or life force;"
17.2% were undecided on the question, 13.1% explicitly denied the existence of god or some
kind of spirit or life force, and 11.3% did not respond to the question. Every concept of god
is found amongst the subjectively religious, as well as the unreligious and the undecided;
belief in a personal god however is restricted to the group of subjectively religious.
An important variable included in the analysis was "frequency of attendance at religious
services" and identification with a religious group or church. Trends in attendance at services
in the period 1968-1992 have been presented in Table 2. In 1992 the proportion of regular
attendees (22.7%) lagged behind the proportion of 'abstainers' (non-attenders~-36.3%) and
occasional attendees (41.0%). Nevertheless 63.7% or two-thirds of the population of adult
Slovenes observed attended religious services at least occasionally. It must be added here that
the Slovene population is predominantly affiliated to the Catholic Church. Table 4 shows that
in the two consecutive surveys in 1992 approximately 70% declared an affiliation to the
Roman Catholic Church; the proportions affiliated to the Protestant and the Orthodox Church
and to Islam were insignificant, while 22% and 26% respectively declared no religious
affiliation. In view of the data on faith, church attendance, and belief in a personal god, it
is quite plain that identification with a religious group is part of cultural-civilizational
tradition in Slovenia and as such does not directly indicate religiousness, although it does help
in understanding .it.
TABLE 4:

Identification with a religious group, church, in
Slovenia
WVS 1992
(February)

Roman Catholic Church

SPO 1992
(Novenber)

69.0

71.3

Evangelical (Lutheran) Church

0.8

1.5

Orthodox Church

1.1

2.4

Other Christian Church

0.9

0.8

Islam

1.5

2.1
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None

26.7

21.9

100%
(1035)

100%
(2024)

Source: RI FSS, University of Ljubljana

Typology of religiousness. Upon joining the two international projects (ISSP, Religion 1991
and WVS 1991) we abandoned our own operationalization of the dimension of religiousness
which had been grounded in the variables of belief (statement of religiousness or
unreligiousness) and attendance at religious services (frequency). Amongst the various options
open we elected the typology used in the European value survey and ·described by Zulehner
(1991, pps 125-126). It employs a combination of the "concept of god" and "frequency of
attendance at religious services" variables (WVS V 175 and V 147). By recoding and combining the two variables we obtained 5 types of religiousnessjunreligiousness, namely:
TYPE

Share in %

A -

orthodox type (theistic, regular church attendance)

13.4

B -

traditional-church type (deistic, regular church attendance)

14.5

C- religious type (theistic, occasional church attendance
or abstinence)

8.6

traditional-religious type (deistic, occasional or no
church attendance)

18.2

E- unreligious type (denial of the existence of god/spirit or
undecided on the question, occasional or no church
attendance)

35.3

D -

100.0% (N=935)*
* Total number surveyed is N=1035, 100 units were excluded from the classification.

In assessing the usefulness of this social-religious typology (Zulehner, 1991) we drew on
a comparison of the results of its application in the Austrian survey which yielded the
following distribution: 15% orthodox, 9% traditional-church, 14% religious, 40% traditionalreligious, and 22% unreligious. The deviations in the Slovenian survey are small and expected
because it had earlier been established that there are more unreligious and more abstainers
from church services in Slovenia than in Austria. The findings from the first section that the
Slovene population splits three ways in relation to religion and the church: a third are
religious and devout, a third are religious and not devout, and a third are unreligious. This
is confirmed in the main with the present typology: a good third (35.3%) are shown to be unreligious; all the remainder (64.7%) are more (27.9%) or less (36.8%) tied to the church or
religion.
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Adoption of this social-religious typology in the analysis of the remaining indicators in
the WVS questionnaire showed the following:
(a) Indicators of religiousness.
-Concept of god (V 135, V 138, V 140): 70% of the 'orthodox' agree with the statementLife is meaningful only because God exists; with the 'traditional-church' amd 'religious'
agreement falls to 35% and 32%, with 'traditional religious' to 9%, and with 'unreligious' to
5%. The picture is similar with the remaining statements.

-Church affiliation (V 244-- V 145). About 96% of 'orthodox' (type A) declare affiliation
to the Roman Catholic Church (type B: 89%, type C:74%, typeD: 56%, type E: 55%). Thus
as many as 55% of the unreligious declare their affiliation to the Roman Catholic Church.
This confirms the above-mentioned conclusion that a statement of affiliation to a church or
religious group is predominantly a matter of cultural-civilizational identification. Only 3%
of the unreligious respondents identified themselves with another church, ;tnd the most
outstanding option was no affiliation to any church (42%). There is a relatively high share
of those declaring no church affiliation in the 'traditional-religious' group--type D (37%),
and the religious--type C (19%). Amongst the 'orthodox' the share is quite negligible (2
respondents).
- Subjective belief (statement of religiousness-- V 151). Of course all 'orthodox' type
respondents are religious (type A: 98%, type B: 89%, type C: 84%, type D: 51%), a third of
the 'unreligious' are subjectively religious, and two-fifths (40.6%) are unreligious or atheists,
and a good quarter (26.4%) are undecided. There is a more substantial share of unreligious
or atheists amongst the 'traditional-religious,' type D (26.1%) and the 'religious,' type C
(I 1.3%), while there are none amongst the 'orthodox.'
TABLE 5: Socio-religious typology and acceptance of religious
teachings (in %)
Believe in

Total
share
N=1035

- God

54.9
23.0
37.4
13.9
14.4
25.0
40.5
18.1
12.4

- life after death

-

soul
devil
hell
heaven
sin
resurrection
reincarnation

TYPE A
TYPE B
Orthodox TraditionalChurch
98.4
64,8
81.6
44.0
47.2

n.o

85.6
64.8
27.2

85.3
44.1
61.8
20.6
23.5
38.2
63.2
36.6
14.0

TYPE C
TYPE D
Religious TraditionalReligious
87.5
35.0
52.5
20.0
21.3
43.8
62.5
26.3
16.3

43.2
15.9
38.6
10.6
9.5
13.6
34.5
6.4
17.0

Type E
Unreligious

23.9
2.4
9.1
1.8
2.1
6.8
14.2
3.3
3.6

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1035)

(125)

(136)

(80)

35

(264)

(330)

Source: WVS, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana

- Various components of faith (V 116-174). Table 5 shows how the respondents on
average, and the various types, accept various components of the faith. Thus, belief in God
(54.9%) is the most outstanding in the population as a whole, followed by belief in sin
(40.5%), and belief in the soul (37.4%). The other components of faith are accepted by
relatively small groups. Belief in God then is the central ingredient of religion or faith, which
is confirmed by the 'orthodox' type which accepts this tenet completely (98.4%). Types Band
Care only slightly behind, but belief in God drops strongly in typeD (traditional-religious 43.2%) and to a poor quarter amongst the unreligious (Type E- 23.9%). Other components
of belief common to types A, B, and C are belief in the soul and belief in sin, whereas all
the other components (eg. life after death, heaven, resurrection from the dead) point to a
type A - type B relationship. In the framework of the survey the 'orthodox' type A emerges
as a completely independent category of orthodox religiousness. With respect to profundity
and scope of belief it is a 'privileged' category. Next come types B and C which display
great similarities, although type B is based on a deistic belief and regular church attendance
and type Con theistic belief and occasional or non-attendance. Characteristic of both is that
in effect they accept belief in god, in sin, and in the soul but strongly reject belief in reincarnation, the devil, and hell. The 'religious' type D (traditional-religious) constitutes an
independent category which is characterized by unintensive, occasional, and arbitrary belief,
with belief in god as the most outstanding (43.2%) followed by belief in the soul (38.6%) and
belief in sin (34.5%). All the other components of belief are marginally represented in this
type, particularly belief in resurrection from the dead (6.4%), in the devil and hell (about
10%), in heaven (13.6%) etc. The 'unreligious', type E of course represents an independent
category which partly expresses atheism. In this group a partial belief in god is expressed by
a weak quarter (23.9%) and belief in sin by one-seventh (14.2%). All the other components
of faith gain insignificant shares (from 9.1 down to 1.8%). Although this type encompasses
the biggest group of respondents, it nevertheless still holds that in the population observed
as a whole there is only a small share of 'pure' atheists who do not subscribe to one or
another of the component beliefs.
We have illustrated then how religiousness, expressed through the concept of god and
church attendance affects the scope and depth of faith. It is more than clear that orthodox
believers are at the same time dogmatic believers and that deviation from its basic religious
teachings and premises is evident with increasing distance from the church.
(b) Influence of socio-religious type on individual attitudes and values.
A group of variables (V 152:- V 165) signifying the province of the church's work and
influence in the contemporary world was included in the analysis. Factor analysis grouped
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these variables into three factors: the first included the most prevalent problems or areas of
decision which do not have a marked religious or ecclesiastic connotation but are nevertheless
ruled upon by most contemporary churches. This is also the case with the Catholic Church.
These areas are: disarmament, the problems of the third world, unemployment, race
discrimination, and ecology and environmental issues. The second factor groups together
aspects and problems that intersect with the precepts of the church, particularly the Catholic,
and contemporary Western (west European) societies. It is significant for this group of issues
that they directly concern the individual and his intimate life. The factor includes: attitudes
towards abortion, extra-marital relations, euthanasia, homosexuality, and also government
policies. Outside this a third independent factor was made up of responses to the question
whether the Church (in Slovenia) responds adequately to: moral problems and the needs of
the individual, family problems, the individual's spiritual needs, and social problems
affecting the home country.
TABLE 6:

Socio-religious typology and issues on which the Church
should take positions (in %)

The Church should
rule on:

Total
share
N=1035

TYPE A
TYPE B
Orthodox TraditionalChurch

TYPE C
TYPE D
Religious TraditionalRel igious

Type E
Unreligious

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------43.2
- disarmament
39.8
44.0
43.4
43.8
33.3
- abortion
- third world
- extra-marital relations
- un~loyment
race discrimination
- euthanasia
- homosexuality
- ecology
- government policy

-

20.6
32.5
18.3
37.0
35.2
21.9
17.0
47.1
15.2

47.2
45.6
45.6
41.6
43.2
32.0
25.6
39.2
23.2

23.5
35.3
19.1
41.9
42.6
23.5
18.4
54.4
14.7

22.5
28.8
26.3
33.8
37.5
25.0
15.0
47.5
17.5

16.7
39.8
12.9
44.7
41.3
23.9
17.8
56.8
12.5

12.4
24.5
10.3
29.4
25.8
16.4
13.6
40.9
10.9

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------(136)
(1035)
(80)
(264)
(125)
(330)
Source: WS, Rl FSS, University of Ljubljana

The results of the factor analysis are illustrated by the data in Table 6. The degree of
concurrence regarding which personal or societal problems the church should take positions
on was substantially lower, and the influence of the Church and its teachings on attitudes was
not as marked, as in the case of the various components of belief. There were no substantial
differences between the different socio-religious types with regard to attitudes towards the
general problems of contemporary society and countries, such as disarmament, the third
world, unemployment, race discrimination, and also ecology. A line of division was only
found between the first four types (A,B,C,D) and type E. Respondents who are more or less
intensively tied to religion and the Church consider that the Church should take positions on
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these general social issues. The 'unreligious' do so with much less intensity. These are
somehow not matters on which the Church should take positions. Nevertheless it may be
stated that the proximity to faith and church does not have an marked sway on these attitudes.
The second group includes those matters and issues that concern the individual's intimate
life, his private world. These are: abortion, extra-marital relations, euthanasia, homsexuality.
The data in Table 6 shows that attitudes on these issues are substantially determined by
proximity to faith and the Church. Attitudes more congruent with Catholic doctrines are
expressed by respondents that come within the 'orthodox' (type A) group, while the
'traditional-church' and 'religious' types (B, C) deviate markedly from type A; an even more
marked deviation is evident with the 'traditional-religious' type (D); the 'unreligious' take
a negative stand in the great majority of cases.
The Church's efforts to increase attendance at its services are quite understandable. This
is seen from the correlation between orthodoxy and the acceptance of the basic tenets of the
faith and also the attitude towards the social and moral role of religion and the church in the
contemporary world. Of course this is far from asserting there is a causal relationship in this.
The fact is however that those who identify with religious teachings and church precepts and
those who adopt the Church's moral rules to a greater extent, also go to church and attend
services.
(c) Socio-demographic characteristics of the socio-religious types.
Having found significant differences in the extent and intensity of faith and in the extent
of the influence of Church teachings on the formation of attitudes towards a series of general
human and intimate matters, it is of course interesting to see if this typology also functions
in the socio-demographic context. For this purpose tests were made with respect to gender,
age, and subjective ranking on a socio-economic status scale.
Gender. Analysis showed that females are represented more strongly than males in types A,
B, and D, while representation in type C was more even. Males were represented much more

strongly in type E (unreligious)--40.4% compared with 30.9% of females.
Age. The oldest age group was most strongly represented in type A, in which the incidence
of youngest group was low (18-25 years of age, 8.8%; 65 years and over, 24.8%). The young
compensated for their low incidence in the foregoing group in type B ('traditional-church':
18-25 years of age--17%; 55-65 years--18%; the other groups range around 12%). In type
C, 'religious', there is a clearly higher incidence of the oldest group, while the incidence of
the first four age groups in type D, 'traditional-religious', is more marked (18-55 years: on
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average around 33%, and that of the two oldest groups much lower (20.7%; 16.3%). The
'unreligious' type E is almost evenly distributed over all age groups, with the 25-35 and 3545 years groups showing slightly higher incidence.
Older people then are more 'orthodoxly religious' than younger. A lower degree of
religiousness in general is shown by the 25-45 year groups, that is those in the midst of
personal and professional ascent. The youngest (18-25 years) cluster most heavily in types B
and D. This group accounts for 51.7% of the youngest and only 28.6% of the oldest (65 and
over). However, although there is a clear relationship between age and religiousness, it is not
possible to posit a directly correlated change in religiousness· with age. The relationship is
much more complex and certainly requires more detailed analysis, as far as Slovenia is
concerned. It is true that the young and the youngest are less devout than the older groups
and that the oldest are the most devout. But it is also true that the youngest and the young
groups are on average equally present in the religious and church space and that they
perceive it more individually, more flexibly and more freely than as some 'belief and
behavior pre-pack'. They are not disciplined worshippers, nor prepared to orthodoxly
conform to church dogma. Finally, their incidence in the 'unreligious' type (E) is only
slightly below average. If non-participation in religious se!vices means 'less' faith, perhaps
this is because young people are the pillars of social development, social change, and revolt.
Perhaps as they grow older they retreat in part to the space of unreligiousness, and in part
become more 'disciplined' in the church and religion space and thus become more 'religious'.
Since conclusions are often drawn about the secularization process on the basis of the growth
of 'religiousness' with increasing age, Hout may be cited (1993) to illustrate this idea: church
attendance, occasional or regular, increases with age in every group of people born in this
century. This data strongly supports the hypothesis of a life cycle but not the hypothesis of
secularization. The life cycle is so powerful, secularization so weak, that comparisons of
different cohorts of the same age do not yield significant differences. This probably cannot
be confirmed by empirical data from Slovenia which is characterized by a dynamic (up and
down) de-secularization process due to various internal and external factors.
Socio-economic status. We drew on the indicator of 'socio-economic status' which allocates
respondents into four categories: (I): the upper, upper middle class; (2) middle class, nonmanual workers; (3): manual workers - skilled and semi-skilled; (4): manual workers unskilled, farm workers, unemployed, etc. It was found that degree of religiousness is
directly proportionate to socio-economic status. This holds to a lesser degree for types Band
C, but is reversed for type D in which the higher and middle classes are more strongly
represented and the skilled/semi-skilled and unskilled less so. TypeD shows strong underrepresentation of only the lowest class. It may be observed then that socio-economic status
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determines the relationship to church and religion and is reflected in the intensity of
religiousness and church attendance. The unreligious are (almost equally) distributed in the
top three status categories which share the common characteristic that personal socioeconomic status is based on completion of at least secondary schooling.
5. Conclusion.

International comparisons have not been included in this short review and preliminary
analysis of WVS Slovenia 1992. The summary results available for the Federal Republic of
Germany (the former West Germany), Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Austria--and the impressions gained from them--suggest that Slovenia
ranks as rather 'normal' in its European space. This also emerged from comparison with ISSP,
Religion 1991. 'Normal' here means that in terms of the distribution of responses in the
religion section and in terms of its values, Slovenia ranks near or together with the
Netherlands, Hungary, Federal Republic of Germany, etc. on the European values
continuum. It is quite removed from the value samples and belief findings for Italy, Poland,
i.e. countries with a marked Catholic cultural tradition. Unquestionably the system
(Communist) and the prevailing ideology had a marked influence on faith and attitudes
towards the church in Slovenia. This holds especially for the initial post-Second World War
years, and the next 20 years. At that time the state, political power, and ideology went
(repressively) hand-in-hand. The ideological monopoly even prevented empirical sociological
research so that no sociological record is available for that time. Subsequently, and this is illustrated by the data, personal value systems broke free of the system, and the power of
ideological indoctrination declined strongly.
In connection with the secularization thesis it may be observed that the secularization
trend reversed in Slovenia in the Eighties. This is evident above all in the growth of
unorthodox forms of religiousness. People feel freer in the religion and church space.
Amongst the young in particular there is a rise in 'secularized religiousness' which is placed
outside and does not acknowledge church institutions. This phenomenon is more closely
linked to the dynamic pluralization of values in the West European space than to the
Slovenian Church. Of course in Slovenia as well, the Church has not reacted appropriately
to this course of events.
The question whether the social revolution (1990) has directly impacted on the
individual's religious sphere may, with some reservations, be answered negatively. Everything
indicated by the results of research into religiousness in Slovenia following the revolution
(ISSP, Religion 1991, WVS 1992) was present or evident as a trend in the Eighties. Of course
the position of the church, church schools, the presence of the church in the mass media and
of church dignitaries in public life, have all changed, and have been formally regulated in
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the Constitution. The process of restitution of church property that had been expropriated
after the war (forests, land, buildings, etc.) has been initiated. However the Church's social
standing is not rising with its 'legalization' and the increase in its social power. The position
of the Church and priests on the confidence scale is low, along with political parties, trade
unions, government institutions, etc. Its return to the arena of social power in Slovenia does
not give the Church any special advantages in exercising its spiritual role.
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